Depth introduction of the topic using an abstract based on the APA writing style. Then, develop the

  

Depth introduction of the topic using an abstract based on the APA writing style. Then, develop the body of the paper using not less than 3 full pages, and no more than 5 pages. Provide transitional sentences from one topic to the next. Double-spaced, uses 1″ margins, and Times New Roman 12 point font.
form_1009w__analytical_assessing_writing_rubric.pdf

_case_study_thunder_run.pdf

Don't use plagiarized sources. Get Your Custom Essay on
Depth introduction of the topic using an abstract based on the APA writing style. Then, develop the
Just from $13/Page
Order Essay

adp_6_0_mission_command.pdf

form_1009w__analytical_assessing_writing_rubric.pdf

microsoft_word_apa_template.docx

purdue_owl_apa_sample_paper.pd.pdf

Unformatted Attachment Preview

US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
Senior Leader Course
Common Core
Form 1009W, Assessing Writing
IAW TP 350-70-7 Appendix C Assessment Instruments
IAW TP 350-70-7 appendix C Assessment Instruments
NAME:
ASSIGNMENT TITLE: Operation Anaconda Case Study Analytical Essay
DATE:
IAW TP 350-70-7 appendix C Assessment Instruments
FACILITATOR:
RATING
UNSATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SUPERIOR
RANGE
0 – 69.9
70 – 89.9
90 – 100
X
GRADE
Higher levels include characteristics of lower levels.
COGNATIVE LEVEL ATTAINED:
ANALYZING:
Breaking material into constituent parts, determining how
the parts relate to each other and to an overall structure or
purpose through differentiating, organizing, and
attributing.
Carrying out or using a procedure through executing, or
APPLYING:
implementing.
UNDERSTANDING:
Constructing meaning from oral, written, and graphic
messages through interpreting, exemplifying, classifying,
summarizing, inferring, comparing, and explaining.
REMEMBERING:
Retrieving, recognizing, and recalling relevant knowledge
from long-term memory.
Writing Assignment
Analyze and evaluate the major points of your case study for research to write your analytical essay.
Use your time to develop a deep understanding of your topic to fully explain how the principles of
mission command were utilized. You are required to give an in depth introduction of your topic.
Provide transitional sentences from one topic to the next. Then develop the body of the paper fully
using no less than 3 full pages and no more than 5 pages, this does not include the title, abstract and
references page. Finally, provide a conclusion. Provide a minimum of two references for your
references page. Ensure you use Times New Roman 12 point font and the current APA Writing Style.
Facilitator’s Comments:
Facilitator’s Signature:
Learner’s Comments:
Learner’s Signature:
IM-1
US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
Senior Leader Course
Common Core
Form 1009W, Assessing Writing
Unsatisfactory
0-6.9 pts.
Does not adequately convey topic.
Does not describe subtopics to be
reviewed. Does not support thesis
statement.
Unsatisfactory
0-27 pts.
Did not introduce any aspect of the
topic or any instances were so
vague as to imply there was much
more information needed. Made
little attempt to correlate the topic
to the overarching theme. The
body is less than three pages.
INTRODUCTION 10%
Satisfactory
7-8.9 pts.
Conveys topic, describes
subtopics to be reviewed.
Generally supports Statement.
Superior
9-10 pts.
Strong introduction of topic clearly
delineates subtopics to be
reviewed. Fully supports thesis
statement.
points for introduction
TOPIC BODY 40%
Satisfactory
Superior
28-35 pts.
35-40 pts.
Partially introduced some of
Solidly introduced all aspects of
aspects of the topic. Developed
the topic preparedness. Fully
and linked the topic to the
linked the topic to the overarching
overarching theme. The body
theme. The body meets 3-5 pages
meets 3-5 pages requirement.
requirement.
points for body
SEQUENCING AND TRANSITION 10%
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Superior
0-6 pts.
7-8 pts.
9-10 pts.
Little evidence material is
Most material clearly related to
Strong organization and
logically organized into topic,
main topic and subtopic. Material
integration of material within
subtopics or related to topic.
may not be organized within
subtopics. Strong transitions
Many transitions are unclear or
subtopics. Attempts to provide
linking subtopics, and main topic.
nonexistent.
variety of transitions.
Unsatisfactory
0-6 pts.
Grammatical errors or spelling
& punctuation substantially
detract from the paper.
points for sequencing and transition
GRAMMAR AND CORRECTNESS 10%
Satisfactory
Superior
7-8 pts.
9-10 pts.
Very few grammatical, spelling or
The paper is free of grammatical
punctuation errors interfere with
errors and spelling & punctuation.
reading the paper.
points for grammar and correctness
READABILITY (sentence structure) 10%
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Superior
0-6 pts.
7-8 pts.
9-10 pts.
Word choice is informal in tone.
Writing has minimal awkward or
Writing flows and is easy to
Writing is choppy, with many
unclear passages.
follow.
awkward or unclear passages.
points for readability
APA FORMATTING 10%
IM-2
Unsatisfactory
0-6.9 pts.
Errors in APA style detract
substantially from the paper.
Unsatisfactory
0-6.9 pts.
No reference. One reference.
Satisfactory
7-8.9 pts.
No more than 3 errors in APA
style that do not detract from the
paper.
Superior
9-10pts.
No errors in APA style.
Possesses a Scholarly style.
points for formatting
REFERENCES 10%
Satisfactory
Superior
7-8.9 pts.
9-10 pts.
2 references.
More than 2 references.
points for references
TOTAL POINTS
IM-3
0.0
Thunder Run in Baghdad, 2003
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.
MG Buford “Buff” Blount faced a critical decision. During the
previous two weeks, his 3d Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized) had raced
700 kilometers through southern Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Baghdad
in early April 2003. The division had overrun both Baghdad’s airport west
of the city (Objective LIONS) and the key intersection of Highways 8
and 1 (Objective SAINTS) directly south of the city, allowing it to create
a partial cordon around the capital. Blount and the senior leaders of US
Army V Corps, 3d ID’s higher headquarters, now needed to seize the city
and collapse Saddam Hussein’s regime, but how?
Blount and V Corps Commander LTG William S. Wallace had no
concrete intelligence about the capability and intent of the Iraqi forces
protecting Baghdad. To collect intelligence about the conventional and
paramilitary units inside the city, they planned an armored reconnaissance
in force. At 1600 on 4 April, Blount gave the mission to COL David G.
Perkins, commander of 3d ID’s 2d Brigade, for execution the following
morning. Staging out of Objective SAINTS, the battalion-sized column
of M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles would attack
north on Highway 8 into the middle of western Baghdad and then turn
west, linking up with COL William Grimsley’s 1st Brigade, 3d ID, at the
airport. The bold plan, which Wallace judged a “reasonable risk,” was
GHVWLQHG WR EHFRPH WKH ¿UVW DUPRUHG IRUD LQWR D PDMRU FLW VLQFH :RUOG
War II.
Perkins assigned the so-called “thunder run” mission to LTC Eric
Schwartz’s Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment (1-64 AR).
Schwartz’s TF 1-64 AR included 731 Soldiers, 30 M1A1 tanks, 14 Bradley
LQIDQWU ¿JKWLQJ YHKLFOHV HQJLQHHU YHKLFOHV DQG RWKHU PHFKDQL]HG
support vehicles. Perkins’ intent was to attack up Highway 8 to “create
as much confusion as I can inside the city because I had found that my
Soldiers or my units can react to chaos much better than the enemy can.”
Although the sudden new mission caught Schwartz off guard, he praised
the straightforward commander’s intent and purpose. “The planning was
simple,” he explained. “The thunder run mission was the simplest of all
tasks that we were given. There was no maneuver required. It was simply
battle orders followed by battle drills.”
At 0600 on 5 April, Schwartz’s armored column rolled north up
Highway 8. In the vanguard of the staggered column was CPT Andrew
105
Hilmes’ Alpha Company. COL Perkins accompanied the task force in
KLV FRPPDQG 0 DUPRUHG SHUVRQQHO FDUULHU WR REVHUYH ¿UVWKDQG WKH
effectiveness and distribution of enemy forces.
Figure 1. 5 April Thunder Run, TF 1-64 AR.
Moments after beginning the movement, the task force came under
LQWHQVH DQG VXVWDLQHG ¿UH 6SHFLDO 5HSXEOLFDQ *XDUG 65* VROGLHUV
Fedayeen Saddam militiamen, Syrian and Palestinian mercenaries, and
RWKHU SDUDPLOLWDU IRUFHV XQOHDVKHG DQ XQUHPLWWLQJ EDUUDJH RI $. ULÀH
¿UH URFNHW SURSHOOHG JUHQDGHV 53*V DQG PRUWDU URXQGV IURP KDVWLO
prepared positions adjacent to the highway. As the task force rumbled
north, police cars, taxis, ambulances, garbage trucks, and other civilian
vehicles massed along the highway, depositing hundreds of additional
HQHP ¿JKWHUV 7KH ULÀH DQG 53* YROOHV WXUQHG WKH RSHUDWLRQ LQWR
VRPHWKLQJ DNLQ WR UXQQLQJ D JDXQWOHW RI ¿UH EXW LW GLG OLWWOH WR VORZ WKH
armored column.
106
TF 1-64 AR Attacking up Highway 8 on 5 April 2003.
Photo Courtesy of the Fort Stewart Museum, US Army.
1HDU WKH ¿UVW RYHUSDVV RQ +LJKZD DQ 53* URXQG H[SORGHG LQ WKH
rear of SSG Jason Diaz’s tank, immobilizing it. As Diaz’s crew struggled
WR SXW RXW D JURZLQJ ¿UH DQG JHW WKH GLVDEOHG WDQN UROOLQJ DJDLQ WUDLOLQJ
Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles formed a defensive perimeter. The
WDQNHUV PRZHG GRZQ GR]HQV RI ¿JKWHUV DVVHPEOLQJ DORQJVLGH WKH KLJKZD
ZLWK FRD[LDO PDFKLQH JXQ ¿UH DQG PDLQ JXQ URXQGV 6LQFH 3HUNLQV¶ RUGHU
emphasized momentum, LTC Schwartz made the call after half an hour
to abandon Diaz’s tank, recover the crew, retrieve sensitive computer
systems, and attack north deeper into the city.
The armored column passed the Qaddissiyah Expressway ramp towards
downtown Baghdad and turned west in the direction of the airport, entering
FURZGHG UHVLGHQWLDO QHLJKERUKRRGV +XQGUHGV RI SDUDPLOLWDU ¿JKWHUV
and military personnel assaulted Schwartz’s column from all directions,
RQO WR IDOO YLFWLP WR WKH $PHULFDQV¶ RYHUZKHOPLQJ ¿UHSRZHU 7KH HQHP
resorted to placing makeshift concrete barriers across the highway and
even launching suicide vehicle attacks but with no success. After two
hours and 20 minutes, the column arrived at the airport. COL Perkins
107
concluded that the reconnaissance in force had completely surprised the
regime. “[The Iraqis] thought that they could bloody our nose enough on
the outside of the city … that we just would not push through block by
block,” Perkins explained. “They weren’t planning for this very heavy
armored thrust busting right through, coming in[to] the city.”
The thunder run demonstrated that US armored forces could penetrate
Baghdad while suffering minimal casualties. During the movement, TF
1-64 AR sustained one destroyed Abrams tank, one heavily damaged
Bradley, one Soldier killed in action (KIA), and four Soldiers wounded in
action (WIA). Schwartz’s task force killed at least 1,000 Iraqi and Syrian
¿JKWHUV GHVWURHG WR 5XVVLDQ PDQXIDFWXUHG %03 LQIDQWU ¿JKWLQJ
vehicles and other vehicles, destroyed one T-72 main battle tank, and
eliminated countless roadside bunkers. The operation provided excellent
LQGLFDWRUV RI HQHP WDFWLFV VWUHQJWK DQG ¿JKWLQJ SRVLWLRQV )RU LQVWDQFH
WKH WDVN IRUFH GLVFRYHUHG WKDW WKH HQHP SUHIHUUHG WR PDVV ¿UHV IURP
overpasses. Perkins observed that the bridges provided the enemy cover
DQG FRQFHDOPHQW DQG DIIRUGHG ³DYHQXHV RI DSSURDFK LQ WKH ÀDQN ´
LTG Wallace and MG Blount praised the 5 April thunder run. They
envisioned it as a prelude to additional armored missions in and out of the
city that would disrupt Baghdad’s defenses with the paramount goal of
regime collapse. Late on 5 April, Wallace ordered a second such mission
for 7 April. Blount again assigned the task to 2d Brigade.
After returning to SAINTS with TF 1-64 AR and receiving Blount’s
orders, Perkins proposed a bolder course of action to his division
commander. He wanted to take two armor task forces into Baghdad and turn
east at the same intersection where TF 1-64 AR had looped west towards
the airport. The task forces would travel several additional kilometers
and occupy the regime’s downtown government complex on the banks
of the Tigris River, the location of Saddam Hussein’s ornate palaces, his
ruling party’s headquarters, parade grounds, and war monuments. With the
rest of V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force bearing down on
%DJKGDG IURP VRXWKZHVW DQG VRXWKHDVW UHVSHFWLYHO 3HUNLQV LGHQWL¿HG WKH
downtown palaces as the regime’s “center of gravity.” He hoped to avoid
an endless cycle of armored forays that scored tactical victories but did not
hasten strategic success.
Perkins also feared that the US Army was losing the information war.
The Iraqi information minister, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, had taken to
the airwaves and falsely announced that Iraqis had slaughtered US Soldiers
outside of Baghdad. To make matters worse, the British Broadcasting
108
Company was broadcasting al-Sahhaf’s propaganda to the world. Perkins
wanted to send an unmistakable message to Iraqis that the regime’s days
were numbered. “I didn’t want [the false stories] to happen again,” he
emphasized. “[Al-Sahhaf’s disinformation was] falsely emboldening the
,UDTLV WR FRQWLQXH WR ¿JKW DQG GHIHQG >WKH FLW@ « VWUHWFKLQJ WKLV ZDU
out.” Perkins concluded that the enemy’s relatively unsophisticated and
XQFRRUGLQDWHG UHVLVWDQFH GXULQJ WKH ¿UVW WKXQGHU UXQ VKRZHG WKDW VXFK D
bold operation was possible.
On 6 April, Blount brought Perkins’ recommendation before LTG
Wallace. The corps commander dismissed it. Even though Wallace sought
to render the regime “irrelevant,” the plan at Combined Forces Land
Component Command (CFLCC) level at this point intended to topple
the regime through synchronized attrition rather than a dramatic armored
thrust. The CFLCC envisioned creating a cordon of forward operating
bases (FOBs) around Baghdad from which US forces could launch
pinpoint raids and seize critical objectives so that they did not have to clear
the city block by block. From a tactical perspective, Wallace also feared
that Perkins might overextend his line of communication (LOC) between
Objective SAINTS and the palace grounds, isolating the task forces in a
KRVWLOH FLW RI ¿YH PLOOLRQ SHRSOH ZLWKRXW WKH DELOLW WR UHVXSSO KLV XQLWV
or evacuate casualties. He directed Blount to take a “less aggressive tactic”
that involved attacking into the city to the point of the airport interchange
but then returning to SAINTS.
The events that unfolded over the next 24 hours serve as a clear
illustration of mission command principles in action. As Perkins prepared
to execute V Corps’ limited objective for the second thunder run, he
conceptualized an additional plan to allow 2d Brigade and its assigned
units to go downtown and “stay the night” if conditions warranted.
Privately, Perkins set four preconditions to meet before he would offer his
option to go downtown and stay during the mission. The preconditions
ZHUH EDVHG RQ ³OHVVRQV OHDUQHG´ GXULQJ WKH ¿UVW WKXQGHU UXQ
7KH G %ULJDGH FRXOG VXFFHVVIXOO ¿JKW LWV ZD LQWR GRZQWRZQ
ZLWKRXW EHFRPLQJ ¿[HG
2. Seizing defensible and symbolic terrain at the downtown palace
complex.
3. Opening and maintaining a ground LOC using Highway 8 and
the Qaddissiyah Expressway between the Tigris River and Objective
SAINTS.
4. Logistical conditions supported remaining overnight.
109
On the afternoon of 6 April, Perkins briefed his intent. Speaking in
a dusty tent without notes, slides, or handouts, Perkins explained to his
subordinate commanders that the entire brigade would conduct a second
thunder run at dawn the next morning. He instructed them to prepare to
spend the night downtown. “We have set the conditions to create the
collapse of the Iraqi regime. Now we’re transitioning from a tactical battle
[sic] to a psychological and informational battle,” he said. Maintaining
momentum during the movement was paramount. “Attack as fast as you
can, and push right through to the center of the city,” Perkins added. “If
D YHKLFOH EHFRPHV GLVDEOHG GXH WR HQHP ¿UH RX LPPHGLDWHO WDNH WKH
crew off, put them on another vehicle, and you just leave it.”
The scheme of maneuver had LTC Schwartz’s TF 1-64 AR assuming
the vanguard. If conditions warranted turning northeast towards
downtown, TF 1-64 AR would seize downtown Objective DIANE, which
included the Tomb of the Unknowns, a park, and a zoo. LTC Philip Draper
deCamp’s TF 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment (TF 4-64 AR), would
follow TF 1-64 AR and seize two of Saddam Hussein’s palaces on the
Tigris River (Objectives WOODY EAST and WOODY WEST). The third
battalion, LTC Stephen Twitty’s TF 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment
(TF 3-15 IN), would keep the LOC open between Objective SAINTS
and downtown. To do so, TF 3-15 IN had to control three vital overpass
intersections on Highway 8, designated as CURLY, LARRY, and MOE.
MOE was the key interchange where Perkins’ Soldiers either had to move
east in the direction of downtown or make a U-turn, returning to SAINTS.
For Perkins, controlling the three overpass intersections was decisive to
securing MG Blount’s approval of his option to go downtown.
The second thunder run got off to a rocky start. In the wake of the 5
$SULO DWWDFN XS +LJKZD WKH ,UDTLV KDG ODLG D PLQH¿HOG RQ WKH KLJKZD
north of SAINTS, extending for 500 meters. At 0538 on 7 April, CPT
David Hibner’s company of 2d Brigade engineers hastily cleared 444
mines. By 0600, TF 1-64 AR, TF 4-64 AR, and TF 3-15 IN departed in that
order in a long column. Only eleven minutes into the movement, enemy
VPDOO DUPV ¿UH 53*V DQG PRUWDU URXQGV HUXSWHG IURP ERWK VLGHV RI WKH
highway. In accordance with COL Perkins’ intent, the two leading task
forces continued to advance and hand over targets to trailing units, which
also recovered the crews of disabled armored vehicles.
3HUNLQV IDFHG KLV ¿UVW FULWLFDO GHFLVLRQ DQ KRXU LQWR WKH RSHUDWLRQ
As the armored column clanked towards MOE, he radioed BG Lloyd J.
Austin III, Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), explaining that the
level of resistance faced by 2d Brigade was less intense than during the
110
previous thunder run. He stated his preconditions for going downtown,
LQVLVWLQJ WKDW KH FRXOG PHHW DOO RI WKHP :LWKRXW JLYLQJ D GH¿QLWLYH
answer, Austin stated that he would inform Blount. He told Perkins to
FRQWLQXH WKH DGYDQFH DQG VHH KRZ WKH ¿JKW GHYHORSHG 6KRUWO DIWHU
the armored column turned east off Highway 8 and, within an hour, seized
DIANE, WOODY EAST, and WOODY WEST. The brigade commander
FDOFXODWHG WKDW KH KDG HQRXJK IXHO WR GHOD D ¿QDO GHFLVLRQ DERXW IRUPDOO
requesting an overnight stay until 1000. In his mind, the shock value
RI NHHSLQJ 86 DUPRU WDVN IRUFHV GRZQWRZQ RXWZHLJKHG WKH VLJQL¿FDQW
risks associated with being isolated in a hostile urban environment.
Figure 2. 7 April Thunder Run, 2d Brigade.
The movement off Highway 8 caused a stir at V Corps headquarters.
When LTG Wallace went to bed on 6 April, he thought that 2d Brigade would
advance to MOE and then make a U-turn, heading back to SAINTS. As the
armored task forces advanced towards the downtown objectives, Wallace
observed the operation on the screen of his Blue Force Tracker. Stunned,
the corps commander asked Blount about the unexpected deviation from
his intent during their regular morning brief. Blount explained Perkins’
HVWLPDWLRQ WKDW WKH GLPLQLVKHG UHVLVWDQFH MXVWL¿HG WXUQLQJ GRZQWRZQ DQG
positioning tanks at Hussein’s palace complex in a dramatic show of the
111
UHJLPH¶V LUUHOHYDQFH 7HQVLRQ ¿OOHG WKH URRP DV :DOODFH FRQWHPSODWHG WKH
situation. Finally, Wallace broke the long silence by signaling his eager
approval. According to COL Russell Thaden, the V Corps Deputy G2
LQWHOOLJHQFH RI¿FHU ZKR ZDV SUHVHQW DW WKH WLPH RI WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQ
Wallace replied, “Go ahead, I trust your judgment. If you think you can
get to the palace and hold it, [its] your call and I’ll clear it [with CLFCC.]”
Refusing to focus on the divergence from his original guidance, Wallace
instead recognized that one of his subordinate commanders had created
an opportunity for success through disciplined initiative and prudent
risk taking. He believed that the overall result of the mission was more
important than the methods used to achieve it. Both the corps and division
commanders therefore deferred to the judgment of the commander on the
ground.
Attacking towards Downtown Baghdad on 7 …
Purchase answer to see full
attachment

  
Basic features
  • Free title page and bibliography
  • Unlimited revisions
  • Plagiarism-free guarantee
  • Money-back guarantee
  • 24/7 support
On-demand options
  • Writer’s samples
  • Part-by-part delivery
  • Overnight delivery
  • Copies of used sources
  • Expert Proofreading
Paper format
  • 275 words per page
  • 12 pt Arial/Times New Roman
  • Double line spacing
  • Any citation style (APA, MLA, Chicago/Turabian, Harvard)

Our guarantees

Delivering a high-quality product at a reasonable price is not enough anymore.
That’s why we have developed 5 beneficial guarantees that will make your experience with our service enjoyable, easy, and safe.

Money-back guarantee

You have to be 100% sure of the quality of your product to give a money-back guarantee. This describes us perfectly. Make sure that this guarantee is totally transparent.

Read more

Zero-plagiarism guarantee

Each paper is composed from scratch, according to your instructions. It is then checked by our plagiarism-detection software. There is no gap where plagiarism could squeeze in.

Read more

Free-revision policy

Thanks to our free revisions, there is no way for you to be unsatisfied. We will work on your paper until you are completely happy with the result.

Read more

Privacy policy

Your email is safe, as we store it according to international data protection rules. Your bank details are secure, as we use only reliable payment systems.

Read more

Fair-cooperation guarantee

By sending us your money, you buy the service we provide. Check out our terms and conditions if you prefer business talks to be laid out in official language.

Read more